(José Niño, Headline USA) In this episode, José Niño sits down with Moscow-based American political analyst Andrew Korybko to discuss the shifting global order—from Russia’s grand strategy in Eurasia to how China and the United States are preparing for long-term strategic rivalry.
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You’re one of the most prolific geopolitical voices on Twitter, especially when it comes to multipolarity and Russia’s role in it. What would you say is Russia’s grand strategy in the Eurasian geopolitical space?
Russia aims to accelerate multipolarity processes across Afro-Eurasia upon concluding that the events set into motion by the special operation created an unprecedented opportunity to do so. The West’s sanctions included weaponizing the dollar, which reduced global confidence in this currency, thus speeding up financial multipolarity processes like de-dollarization. BRICS, for all of its limitations as a voluntary association of countries, has done a lot to take this trend forward.
In parallel with that, Russia began selling its oil and gas in national currencies, which chips away at the dollar’s dominance. On the African front, it practices what can be called “Democratic Security”, or helping to defend its partners’ national models of democracy. This takes the form of dispatching military advisers, providing socio-economic guidance, and promoting a positive image of these countries in its global media ecosystem. The combined effect counteracts Western regime change plots.
“Democratic Security” also characterizes Russia’s grand strategy towards Central Asia, but it takes other forms elsewhere in Eurasia. For instance, Russia sells arms to rivals such as China-India, China-Vietnam, and Iran-Saudi Arabia as part of its “military diplomacy”, which refers to its efforts to retain the military balance so that they’re more inclined to pursue diplomatic solutions to their disputes. By contrast, the United States usually only arms one rival, expecting that they’ll use coercion or force to advance their agenda.
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Trump famously promised to end the Russia-Ukraine war in 24 hours. Yet, he’s now signaling support for continued military aid to Ukraine. In your view, why has he failed to deliver on that promise?
It was always unrealistic to expect NATO’s proxy war on Russia to end within 24 hours and Trump himself later admitted that he was just exaggerating when he espoused such rhetoric. The crux of the problem is that Russia and the United States have contradictory endgames in mind and neither wants to compromise. Moreover, the United States won’t coerce Ukraine into complying with Russia’s demands for peace, while Russia won’t concede to accepting Ukraine’s continued control over the regions that Moscow claims as its own.
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Even establishment figures like Marco Rubio are starting to acknowledge the reality of multipolarity. How do you think the United States will adapt to a world where it’s no longer the unipolar hegemon?
The United States has been adapting to this reality since the Obama years when he announced the so-called “Lead From Behind” policy during NATO’s War on Libya wherein the United States provided back-end support to France, Italy, and the UK. This approach aims to “share the burden” for maintaining the “Global West’s” hegemony, which Trump has made explicit and taken to its extreme. Basically, the United States will support like-minded partners with shared geopolitical interests, but it’ll try not to get embroiled in regional conflicts.
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China is the United States’ top strategic rival. Over the next decade, do you see Beijing taking a more aggressive stance — say, over Taiwan or the South China Sea — or sticking to the long game by expanding its economic influence across Eurasia and the Global South?
China could have hypothetically made a military move against Taiwan during the onset of Russia’s special operation, but either Putin didn’t inform Xi in advance or Xi didn’t feel comfortable doing so in any case. Officially, China aims to reunify with its renegade island province through peaceful means via closer economic integration and then some forthcoming political solution, but this long game creates an opportunity for the United States to “Ukrainize” Taiwan by turning it into a heavily armed “anti-China”.
Furthermore, the United States is expanding what can be described as AUKUS+, or the three AUKUS countries and Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea. Taken to its conclusion, this could form the core of an “Asian NATO”, which might then more aggressively contain China in East and Southeast Asia. AUKUS+ is being relied on instead of the Quad since India refuses to subordinate itself to the United States as that country’s junior partner, which the United States demands that it do and then contribute to this containment coalition as a proxy.
China and India still have unresolved border disputes, and India does indeed rely on some U.S. military, intelligence, and logistical support to give itself an edge in the aforesaid, but this doesn’t equate to it being an American puppet, which it’s loath to become due to its hard-earned strategic autonomy. India also proudly defied the United States’ sanctions on Russia and was aghast at Trump tacitly taking Pakistan’s side during the latest conflict so it’s therefore expected to remain outside the United States’ regional proxy network.
This doesn’t mean that India will soon resolve its border disputes with China, just that China can breathe a sigh of relief knowing that ties with India will remain bilateral and not become an extension of the Sino-American rivalry. Looking forward, China will certainly come under more pressure from the United States and India, but it’s unlikely to initiate a large-scale conflict in the region, whether over Taiwan or whichever other dispute. That said, the United States will still try to provoke such a conflict, but it’s unclear whether it’ll succeed.
Follow Andrew Korybko’s work below:
– Substack: korybko.substack.com
– X/Twitter: @AKorybko
José Niño is the deputy editor of Headline USA. Follow him at x.com/JoseAlNino
